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Abstract: 
We investigate the geo-political and economic aspects of human rights 
(HR) performance using multi-country panel data. HR performance 
depends on relative levels of economic development and spatial proximity 
to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ neighbours. We test for basic effects of income, and 
apply spatial weighting models, to analyse the neighbours’ impact on HR 
levels, treating this impact as partly endogenous. We take into account size 
and distance, to compare each country’s HR performance with what would 
be predicted from a weighted average of its neighbours’ performance. 
There are (a) geographical clusters and (b) size and proximity effects for 
HR performance.5 
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1 Introduction 
 
The protection of civil and political rights varies across time and space. In explaining this variation, 
the extant cross-national and quantitative literature on human rights has looked at socio-economic 
factors either explicitly (e.g. Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Henderson, 1993; Heinisch, 1998; 
Abouharb and Cingranelli, 2007; Landman and Larizza, 2009; Landman, Kernohan, and Gohdes, 2012) 
or implicitly as control variables alongside different sets of social, political and cultural explanatory 
variables (e.g. Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999; Camp Keith, 2012). Model estimations 
in the literature also include controls for fixed effects or for regional and sub-regional variation 
typically as robustness checks (e.g. Landman, 2005a; Landman and Larizza, 2009). Absent from this 
kind of modelling of human rights performance, however, is any attention to processes of spatial 
diffusion, where the human rights practices of one state have an influence on the human rights 
practice of another. In this paper, we focus explicitly on the economic geography and diffusion of 
human rights performance with respect to physical integrity rights using a combined human rights 
factor score, regional dummy variables, and spatial weightings for both the size and proximity of 
neighbours. 
As an initial window into our topic, a simple comparison of trends in human rights 
performance across world regions, over the past three decades, shows that there are two broad 
`clubs'. In 1980, one club consisted of Western Europe, North America and Oceania, and the other 
comprised the rest of the world. Between 1980 and 2004 the only major change occurred in the 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), which have moved from the `bad' convergence 
club to the `good' (note some Latin American countries have also improved significantly). We argue 
that these kinds of trends may reflect both income and spatial factors. For example, our human 
rights factor score shows a clear relationship with levels of national income. Ranking 149 countries in 
2004 according to GDP per capita, 19 out of the top 20 countries are also in the top 30 in terms of 
human rights. At the other end of the table, however, while several out of the bottom 20 countries 
in terms of per capita GDP also rank badly for human rights - Congo, Burundi, Ethiopia, Chad, Nepal - 
it is also noticeable that Mali is 34th in terms of human rights, while Ghana, Burkina Faso and Guinea 
Bissau are in the top 60. Just as economists have long recognised that certain poor countries (such as 
Sri Lanka and Cuba) have managed to provide relatively good healthcare and educational levels, we 
wish to analyse regional patterns in human rights, and the extent to which these vary for reasons 
other than simply income level differences.  
While taking such income levels into account, we examine the degree to which there may be 
good or bad human rights neighbourhood effects. Our modelling examines the human rights effect 
of the relative size and proximity of neighbouring states. In particular, we are interested to examine 
the following issues. First, to what degree does having a human rights `good' neighbour’ affect a 
country's level of human rights performance? Second, to what degree does distance from such a 
good neighbour affect a country's level of human rights performance? Third, are clusters of good 
human rights performers a function of both their level of income and proximity to good neighbours? 
In order to provide answers to these questions, the paper is structured in several sections. 
Section 2 examines the literature on diffusion and examines arguments on the possible effects of 
intentional and unintentional diffusion on the spread of human rights performance. Section 3 
contains a brief discussion of the historical spread and regional patterns of human rights, in 
particular outlining the role of international human rights standards and treaties. Section 3.1 sets 
out some stylised facts and statistical tests suggestive that there may be significant economic and 
spatial relationships in human rights performance, and establishes some the broad trends within and 
between global regions. Section 4 outlines the full method for spatial econometric analysis. Section 
4.1 discusses methodological issues relating to the data and the associated problems of estimation. 
Section 4.2 reports the results of the spatial econometric analysis and Section 5 concludes with a 
discussion of some of the significant implications of spatial diffusion identified in this paper. 
Appendix 6 contains a detailed description of the database of human rights and other indicators. 
2 Diffusion of Human Rights 
The literature on diffusion from international relations, comparative politics and political economy is 
based on the assumption that nation states do not exist in autarky and that developments in one 
country are influenced by and can influence developments in another country. Such cross-national 
diffusion can be the result of both intentional and unintentional interactions of states. Intentional 
activity such as trade, direct foreign direct investment (FDI), overseas development assistance (ODA), 
international regimes, and coercion and unintentional interaction such as proximity, natural 
processes of `contagion', and globalisation (and all that it entails), can both lead to the diffusion of 
ideas, norms, practices, and policies (see Young, 1980; 1999a, 1999b; Whitehead, 1996; Kopstein 
and Reilly, 2000; Landman, 2005; 2008; Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2007). The underlying logic to 
explanations of intentional diffusion is based on the idea that one state or group of states seeks to 
change the behaviour of another state or group of states through a concerted set of actions and 
policies that are specifically designed to change the structure of incentives (Simmons, Dobbin and 
Garrett, 2008). Coercive measures for changing behaviour include military intervention, peace-
keeping, democracy promotion, aid conditionality, economic sanctions, regional integration, and 
other measures available to powerful states. Non-coercive measures for change include the use of 
soft power, advocacy, persuasion, and networks of transnational non-governmental organisations, 
which form alliances and operate between states and inter-governmental organisations in an effort 
to aggregate interests and bring about positive change in pursuit of them (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; 2013; Tarrow, 2005; Tilly and Tarrow, 2012). 
Awareness of the importance of human rights has increased progressively since the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The variability in human rights practices has become an 
additional area that may be susceptible to diffusion effects. As in other areas where diffusion effects 
are examined, the underlying assumption is that some form of concerted effort over time by one set 
of states will yield a better protection of human rights in another set of states. As well as the 
intentional processes of diffusion in the field of human rights, the world has witnessed a 
proliferation of international human rights law that has grown in both breadth (i.e. the number of 
rights that receive explicit legal protection) and depth (i.e. the number of states participating in the 
international regime) (Landman, 2005b; 2013). This growth in international human rights law has 
been buttressed by states that have increasingly tied human rights ‘conditionality’ to their aid, trade 
and foreign policies and international non-governmental organisations that are able to connect 
domestic mobilisation for human rights to intergovernmental agencies and organisations that 
engage with states in an effort to change their human rights practices. These developments are 
complemented by an increasing standard of accountability by which the performance of states is 
now judged (see Fariss, 2014). To date, there is mixed evidence for intentional diffusion effects 
concerning the impact of FDI (Meyer, 1996; Richards, Gelleny and Sacko, 2002; Landman, 2005a; 
Blanton and Blanton, 2006; 2009), ODA (Knack, 2004; Landman, 2005a), the international human 
rights regime (Camp Keith, 1999; Hathaway, 2002; Hafner Burton and Tsuitsui, 2005; Neumayer, 
2005; Landman, 2005b; Simmons, 2009; Smith-Cannoy, 2012; Hafner-Burton, 2013), and 
transnational advocacy networks (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; 2013; Landman, 2013).  
Beyond the intentional dimensions of diffusion, there is a dearth of analysis on the 
unintentional processes of diffusion: the degree to which a country’s protection of human rights is a 
function of patterns of economic development and the economic geography of the world. States are 
part of a global economic system in which both levels of wealth and spatial proximity to ‘good 
neighbour’ states vary. Neighbours can be large and small, rich and poor, and `good' or `bad' 
protectors of human rights. It is not unreasonable to expect that the human rights practices of one 
state may have an impact on the human rights practices of other states, particularly if one takes into 
account the relative size of neighbouring states. Thus, in addition to general income effects around 
various `clubs' of states, identified briefly above and discussed in more detail below, we also expect 
two kinds of unintentional diffusion effects: (1) states that are proximate to large and `good' human 
rights protectors, ceteris paribus, ought to have a higher probability of being a good human rights 
protector and see improvements over time; (2) states that are proximate to large and `bad' human 
rights protectors ought to have a lower probability of being a good human rights protector and see 
fewer improvements over time. The construction of the data set, methods of estimation and 
empirical results that provide support for these two main propositions are now discussed in turn. 
 
 
3 Regional Patterns of Human Rights 
 
As a simple introductory procedure to check on the plausibility of our analysis, Figures 1(a)-(f), below, 
present descriptive statistics on the geographic history of HR performance, which suggest that 
regional levels of HR can change significantly in relative terms over time. In Figures 1(a) and 1(b) we 
plot the HR performance in the commonwealth of independent states (CIS) after the Soviet breakup: 
while these countries showed some diversity immediately after the Soviet downfall, there appears 
to have been a subsequent convergence, possibly in a worsening direction. Likewise, Figures 1(c) and 
1(d) show worsening trends in the Middle East (MEAST) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
 
 
Figure 1(f) shows the trends in the regional average HR performance over the thirty-year 
period, as well as intra-regional variation. Comparing means of the various regions shows that there 
appear to be two `clubs' in 1980. One club consists of Western Europe/ North America and Oceania, 
and the other the Rest of the World. Between 1980 and 2010 the only major real change is the 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), which move from the `bad' convergence club to the 
`good'. Latin America has shown a modest improvement, reflecting the fall of dictatorships and 
military authoritarian regimes, while the Middle East/North Africa, Asia and the CIS countries have 
actually worsened, particularly in the period to the mid-1990s (with some recovery since). We find 
strong positive correlations between HR and per capita GDP. This is consistent with other studies 
that provide strong evidence that richer countries supply their citizens with better rights protection 
(see, e.g. Mitchel and McCormick, 1988; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999; Landman 
and Larizza, 2009; Landman et al 2012), but at the same time, there is weaker evidence that HR 
benefit economic growth (Blume and Voight, 2007; see also Norris 2012). Although we did not find a 
clear relationship between changes in HR and changes in GDP, this may indicate that the relationship 
between GDP and HR is a long-term one, not short-term in keeping with the social capital argument 
favoured by Sen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 1(a)-(f): Trends in the IHRFACTOR human rights index across countries, grouped by region. 
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3.1 Results from Non-spatial Regressions  
In order to examine these issues further, in Table 1 we regress HR performance from three time 
periods (1981-1990, 1991-2000, and 2001-2010) on a series of regional dummies. The dummy for 
Western Europe/North America (WENA) was dropped so that the regressions compare all other 
regions with this advanced set of countries. Consequently, the constant (which decreases between 
the earlier and later periods) represents the average level for WENA countries, while other values 
represent the difference in HR performance from the WENA countries. 
 
 
 
Table-1: Regional differences in HR performance (1981-2010) 
Ihrfactor 1981-90 1991-2000 2001-10 
SSA -0.454*** -0.657*** -0.500*** 
Asia -0.656*** -0.809*** -0.626*** 
CEEC -0.479*** 0.216*** 0.605*** 
CIS 
 
-0.311*** -0.323*** 
LAC -0.505*** -0.439***           -0.109* 
MEAST -0.851*** -1.112*** -0.889*** 
OCEANIA 1.372*** 1.429*** 1.252*** 
_cons 0.313*** 0.229*** 0.130*** 
N 1510 1630 1630 
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.137 0.170 
*= significant at 10% level, **= significant at 5% level, ***= significant at 1% level 
 
The first thing to note is that regional dummies are all significant, with the Middle East 
(MEAST) and Asia showing particularly poor performance. We note a change in sign on the CEEC 
coefficient, which implies that regions can also change performance significantly in relative terms. In 
fact, the CEECs did improve markedly in this respect, where estimates change from negative 
coefficients for the period 1980-1989 to positive coefficients in the two latter periods; a change that 
is in line with expectations given the transition away from authoritarianism after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989. Since the regional dummies are all significant, one 
would expect country-specific effects on HR performance. So we regressed levels of HR performance 
on a number of socio-economic variables along with country and time dummy variables. Summary 
statistics on the socio-economic variables are provided in Table 2, below.  
 
Table-2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
state id 2730 46 26.272 1 91 
Year 2730 1995.5 8.657 1981 2010 
Ln GDP 2730 8.002 1.657 3.912 11.381 
Ln Land inequality 2730 52.081 22.419 -0.727 100 
Ln Income inequality 2730 43.814 6.960 24.77 64.75 
Polity 2730 3.444 6.956 -10 16.147 
Domestic conflict 2730 3.277 2.646 -4.725 12 
Catholic 2730 0.329 0.470 0 1 
Muslim 2730 0.197 0.398 0 1 
Ihrfactor 2488 0.011 0.998 -2.115 1.818 
 
 
For the regressions we need a balanced panel. Since there are no data for the CIS countries 
before 1992 we had to drop these countries from the sample hence our new sample comprises a 
panel of 91 countries between 1981 and 2010. Results of models without spatial interactions are 
shown in Table 3, below. 
 
 
Table 3: Panel data models without spatial interaction effects (1981-2010) 
Determinants (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS Spatial Fixed effects Time Period Fixed 
Effects 
Spatial and Time 
Period Fixed Effects 
Domestic  conflict -0.158*** 
(-22.702) 
-0.067*** 
(-10.737) 
-0.191*** 
(-27.837) 
-0.094*** 
(-14.538) 
Ln GDP  0.196*** 
(15.514) 
0.025 
(0.555) 
0.138***        
(11.268) 
0.352*** 
(6.674) 
Polity 0.030*** 
(11.850) 
0.027*** 
(10.361) 
0.045***        
(17.663)   
0.045*** 
(16.202) 
Ln Land inequality -0.006*** 
(-9.288) 
0.0128*** 
(7.485) 
-0.008***        
(-11.709) 
0.002  
(1.578) 
Intercept -0.842 *** 
(-6.779) 
   
sigma^2 0.631 0.278 0.553 0.251 
R-squared 0.534 0.098 0.590 0.175 
Rbar-squared 0.533 0.097 0.590 0.174 
N 2730 2730 2730 2730 
Log L -3244.2 -2126 -3063.9 -1985.2 
LM test no Spatial Lag, 
Prob 
118.768, 0 62.243, 0 85.443, 0 38.333, 0 
Robust LM test no 
Spatial Lag, Prob 
49.065, 0 25.400, 0 0.120, 0.729 3.593, 0.058 
LM test  no Spatial error, 
Prob 
373.233, 0 93.639, 0 153.891, 0 34.788, 0 
Robust LM test no 
Spatial error, Prob 
303.530, 0 56.797, 0 68.567, 0.473 0.048, 0.826 
LR-test joint significance spatial fixed effects, degrees of freedom and probability = 2157.495, 91, 0 
LR-test joint significance time-period fixed effect, degrees of freedom and probability =281.720,30, 0 
 
Note: t-values in parentheses.  
In almost all specifications of the non-spatial panel data model of Table 3, we found the level 
of HR to be significantly positively related to the level of income and Polity, and significantly 
negatively related with domestic conflict (see also Landman and Larizza, 2009).  The classic- LM test 
proposed by Anselin (1988), or robust LM-test proposed by Anselin et al (1996) determines whether 
spatial lag model or the spatial error model is more appropriate than non-spatial panel data model. 
The classic-LM test rejects the hypothesis of no spatially lagged dependent variable and the 
hypothesis of no spatially auto-correlated error term at 5% as well as 1% significance, irrespective of 
the inclusion of spatial and/or time-period fixed effects. However, in case of robust-LM test the 
hypothesis of no spatially auto-correlated error and the hypothesis of no spatially lagged dependent 
variable can no longer be rejected at 5% as well as 1% significance, provided that time-period or 
spatial and time-period fixed effects are included (see Elhorst, 2010). The likelihood ratio (LR) test 
rejects the hypothesis that the spatial fixed effects are jointly insignificant (2157.4957, 91 [df], p < 
0.01). Similarly, the hypothesis that the time-period fixed effect are jointly insignificant is rejected 
(281.7208, 30 [df], p < 0.01). These results justify the extension of the model with spatial and time-
period fixed effects (Baltagi, 2005).  
Although we succeed in identifying regional differences in levels of HR performance in these 
non-spatial regressions, the spatial dependence observed above may not reflect a truly spatial 
process but merely the geographic clustering of the sources of the behaviour in question as 
neighbouring countries have shared or similar attributes. What we wish to try to capture is a 
country's HR performance relative to its neighbours, which may arise through a variety of potential 
geographical spillover or diffusion mechanisms. Hence, the following section focuses on a method 
for determining how human rights vary spatially. 
 
4. Establishing Spatial Effects 
In order to capture a country’s true HR performance relative to its neighbours, we need to establish 
a spatial effect. First, a regional pattern may reflect common causal factors, which happen to be 
concentrated in certain global regions. For example, in the case of property rights and the rule of law, 
Acemoglu et al (2005) argue that different patterns of colonisation have resulted in very different 
patterns: in those areas which European colonists found relatively empty, they instituted property 
laws and institutions which favoured fairly equitably the rights of all the new settlers, whereas 
where there was an existing large population and/or a valuable resource base to exploit, institutions 
were put in place which favoured the colonists at the expense of the indigenous (or imported slave) 
population. Nunn’s (2007b) work on the role of slavery in determining bad institutions in Africa is in 
this same tradition. There are good reasons to believe that persistence of bad institutions may also 
apply in the case of human rights. 
Countries in a region can also share a common culture, which may be more or less 
favourable to human rights (or interpret them in different ways to Western compilers of HR indices). 
Alternatively, there may be common causes in the sense of regional security crises. There may be 
rebellions by cross-border ethnic groups, such as the Kurds in Turkey and Northern Iraq. Civil wars 
may spread across borders (for example, the displacement of the Rwandan crisis in the 1990s to 
neighbouring Congo). Moreover, even though economic activity, such as GDP per capita, can have 
spatial patterns, we can correct for this by including GDP per capita in any spatial regressions. When 
we estimate the effect on HR in one country on the human rights of its neighbours, then any 
spillover in GDP can be controlled in our estimations.  
Second, the alternative explanation of spatial patterns is that there are direct spillovers 
between HR performance in one country and its neighbours, or ‘unintentional’ diffusion effects. 
There is plenty of evidence of such diffusion, as can be seen in Latin America of the1980/90s or the 
Middle East and North Africa today. A country which liberalises its political and legal system with no 
adverse effects (or maybe with benefit) is likely to have a positive influence upon other countries. 
We would expect this effect to be stronger, the closer the ties between countries’ citizens, and the 
greater the similarities between the countries. In this way, there may a ‘gravity’ type spatial spill 
over mechanism, since a country which is large and nearby will have more effect on its neighbours. 
These types of spillover effects and processes of spatial diffusion are modelled and estimated in the 
next section. 
 
4.1. Modelling Strategy 
Our modelling strategy is to first look at economy and HR relationships, then at the issue of spatial 
clusters of HR performance (analogous to performance on standard measures of socio-economic 
progress), and then at gravity or neighbourhood effects in the spirit of international trade linkages, 
which demonstrate the importance of proximity. We develop a spatial econometric model based 
upon a panel of 91 countries between 1981 and 2010. A critical assumption here is that changes in 
one country’s HR performance may be correlated with performance in other countries, where the 
degree of correlation depends on the distance between the two countries. Such an assumption is 
common in spatial econometrics (see Arbia et al, 2010).  
Spatial econometric models treat cross-border spillovers as a form of autocorrelation (in 
terms of distance rather than autocorrelation over time), where Moran’s I statistic and the Local 
Indicator for Spatial Autocorrelation (LISA) are used to check the global and local autocorrelation, 
respectively. The Moran’s I statistic is given by the following expression: 
𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖 , (1) 
 
 
 
Fig-2 
 
Note: Moran’s Scatterplots of Human Rights are based upon inverse squared distance and inverse squared distance 
times relative population 
Figure 2, above, reports the results of Moran’s I statistic for HR in 1992, regardless of the spatial 
structure imposed, and this variable shows a positive association between the original variable and 
its spatially lagged version. Figure 2 clearly indicates that HR performance should not be viewed as a 
randomly distributed variable, but rather as one that has systematic spatial attributes. The spatial 
autocorrelation for human rights is 0.3105 using our specification of the inverse of the squared 
distance and the population weighted measure of autocorrelation is 0.3114. This spatial 
autocorrelation suggests that countries with good HR performance are more likely to be close to 
each other. If this spatial dependence is reflected in the error term, regression results using standard 
econometric estimators, which ignore spatial dependence, will prove unreliable. We therefore use a 
spatial extension of the linear regression model. 
As pointed out by Anselin, Gallo, and Jayet (2008), a spatial panel data model may contain a 
spatially lagged dependent variable  known as spatial lag model with endogenous interaction effect 
or the model may incorporate a spatially autoregressive process in the error term known as spatial 
error model with interaction effects among the error term. A third model, advocated by LeSage and 
Pace (2009), contains a spatially lagged dependent variable and spatially lagged independent 
variables known as spatial Durbin model with both endogenous and exogenous interaction effect. 
Formally, the spatial Durbin model is formulated as (see Elhorst, 2010): 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿�𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝐽𝐽=1
+  𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + �𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛
𝐽𝐽=1
+ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dependent variable for cross-sectional unit i at time t (i=1,...N; t= 1,....., T). 
∑ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   stands for the interaction effect of the dependent variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  with the dependent 
variables 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in neighboring units, where 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the i,jth element of a pre-specified nonnegative N*N 
spatial weights matrix W describing the arrangement of the spatial units in the sample. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 a 1*K 
vector of exogenous variables, and β a K*1 vector of fixed but unknown parameters. The spatial 
Durbin model extends the spatial lag model with specially lagged independent variables where 𝜃𝜃 is a 
K*1 vector of parameters.  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an independently and identically distributed error term for i and t 
with zero mean and constant variance.  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 denotes a country specific effect which control for all 
county-specific time-invariant variables whose omission could bias the estimates in a typical cross-
sectional study. 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 denotes a time-period specific effect which control for all time-specific effects 
whose omission could bias the estimates in a typical time–series study (Baltagi 2005). If 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 and/or 
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 are treated as fixed effects, the intercept 𝛼𝛼 can only be estimated under the condition/conditions 
that ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 = 0𝑖𝑖  and ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 = 0𝑖𝑖 . An alternative and equivalent formulation is to drop the intercept 
from the model and to abandon one of these two restrictions (see Hsiao 2003, 33). We followed the 
latter in our estimation. We also adopted the bias correction procedure proposed by Lee and Yu 
(2010a). However such bias correction will have hardly had any effect if T is large (Elhorst, 2012).   
Now one potential spatial weight matrix is expressed as the inverse of the squared distance 
between each pair of countries (distance between capitals) to account for the intuition that a given 
country is more related to those countries that are closer. 
𝑊𝑊 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗, 
𝑊𝑊 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑑𝑑2 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗 
(3) 
where distance-only weight W is the spatial weight and dij denotes the geographical distance 
between capitals of any two countries i and j. In addition to distance, simple spatial weighting can 
also be done according to population size (using period average population), where it is likely that 
countries with a larger population have a greater impact on neighbouring countries. 
𝑊𝑊 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗, 
𝑊𝑊 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑑𝑑2 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗         
(4) 
where the distance and population-based weight W is a function of the inverse squared distance 
between country i and j, as well as the ratio of the population of country j to the population of 
country i. It is also possible to use a weighting scheme based on GDP (as in gravity modelling of 
trade); however, the main problem with this is that GDP may not be entirely exogenous, which could 
cause estimation biases in a spatial econometric model.  
 
4.2. Results from Spatial Regressions 
Anselin (1988) proposed the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator to produce reliable results when 
there is a spatially auto-correlated dependent variable. For panel estimates we used its extension 
proposed by Elhorst (2010). Since in section 3.2 the non-spatial model was rejected on the basis of 
LM test, this section estimates a spatial model with/without country and time period fixed effects. A 
spatial Durbin model was also estimated to test whether it can be simplified to the spatial lag or 
spatial error model. We followed the row-normalization procedure of the spatial weights matrix for 
ease of interpretation.    
In Table 4 we present the results of panel regressions without fixed effects. In column 1 and 
2 of table 4, we used the distance-only weighting scheme, while in the next two columns we used a 
distance and population-based weighting scheme. In column 1 of table 4 the effect of per capita GDP 
and Polity on human rights is significant (at 1% level) and positive (0.142 and 0.031) as expected. 
Domestic conflict and land inequality are found to be significantly (at 1% level) and negatively (-
0.150 and -0.006) correlated with HR. The variable W*dep.var denotes the interaction effect of the 
level of HR in a country with the level of HR in neighbouring countries. The significant (at the 1% 
level) and positive (0.251) spatial coefficients on the W*dep.var variable establishes that a 
neighbourhood effect exists. Hence, it would appear that ‘beacon’ countries can play an important 
role in disseminating good HR practice to neighbours, and by extension, from the same result, that 
rogue countries can potentially destabilize (even) virtuous neighbours.  
 
Table 4: Panel data models with spatially lagged dependent variable, No fixed effect (1981-10) 
Determinants (1) 
W1= dist 
(2) 
W1=dist 
(3) 
W2= popdist 
(4) 
W2=popdist 
Domestic 
conflict 
-0.151*** 
(-21.68) 
-0.145*** 
(-20.801) 
-0.152*** 
(-22.644) 
-0.144*** 
(-21.335) 
Ln GDP  0.143*** 
(11.214) 
0.150*** 
(11.647) 
0.111*** 
(9.084) 
0.123*** 
(9.999) 
Polity 0.032*** 
(12.378) 
0.024*** 
(8.875) 
0.035*** 
(14.124) 
0.029*** 
(10.935) 
Ln land 
inequality 
-0.006*** 
(-8.540) 
-0.006*** 
(-8.248) 
-0.007*** 
(-10.025) 
-0.006** 
(-9.114) 
Catholic 
 
-0.151*** 
(-4.268)  
-0.213*** 
(-6.142) 
Muslim 
 
-0.429*** 
(-10.284)  
-0.418*** 
(-10.321) 
W*dep.var. 0.249*** 
(11.540) 
0.253*** 
(11.641) 
0.359*** 
(17.199) 
0.366*** 
(17.242) 
intercept -0.477*** 
(-3.905) 
-0.391 *** 
(-3.152) 
-0.044 
(-0.372) 
0.009 
 (0.076) 
R-squared 0.559 0.576 0.583 0.601 
Corr-squared 0.507 0.532 0.470 0.492 
Nobs 2730 2730 2730 2730 
Log L -3184.879 -3131.399 -3115.013 -3056.083 
 
In the model without fixed effects it is possible to include cultural or other variables, which 
may be largely invariant over time (see column 2 of Table 4). This is important, since the inclusion of 
these variables may help us interpret the degree to which our estimated spatial weightings are 
picking up regionally-varying historical or cultural factors. For this reason, we include both a dummy 
variable for Catholic culture and a Muslim dummy in the regression equation. The omitted variable 
can thus be described as “Protestants and others”. Inclusion of these variables did not change our 
findings and we can say that there are indeed regional spillovers, in addition to some spatially-
varying cultural factors present. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 where distance and population-based 
weighting scheme was considered, the significant  and positive spatial coefficients on the W*dep.var 
variable establishes that size and proximity effect exists in a given countries relative progress in 
human rights performance. Our results appear robust since most of the estimated coefficients are 
little affected by the choice of distance-only weighting and distance and population-based weighting. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Panel data models with spatially lagged dependent variable, spatial and time period fixed effects 
(1981-2010), robustness check 
Determinants (1) 
W1= Dist 
(3) 
W1= Dist 
(2) 
W2=Popdist 
(4) 
W2=Popdist 
domconflict -0.091*** 
(-14.178) 
-0.091*** 
( -13.890) 
-0.091*** 
(-13.767) 
-0.095*** 
(-18.700) 
Ln GDP   0.320*** 
(6.105) 
0.319***         
(5.968) 
0.326*** 
(6.086) 
0.291*** 
(7.143) 
Polity 0.044*** 
(15.880) 
0.043***        
(15.220) 
0.044*** 
(15.620) 
0.045*** 
(20.341) 
Ln land inequality 0.001 
(0.742)  
0.001 
(0.680)  
Ln income inequality 
 
0.008          
(1.603)  
0.003 
(1.159) 
W*dep.var. 0.158*** 
(5.761) 
0.181*** 
(6.662) 
0.209*** 
(7.302) 
0.251*** 
(9.491) 
sigma^2 0.246 0.257 0.257 0.257 
R-squared 0.818 0.818 0.818 0.818 
Corr-squared 0.176 0.177 0.173 0.174 
Nobs 2730 2730 2730 2730 
LogL -1967.897 -1966.821 -1971.493 -1970.603 
LR-test joint significance 
spatial fixed effects, degrees 
of freedom and probability 
2447.722, 
91,  0 
2525.734, 
91, 0 
2287.165, 
91, 0 
2397.851, 
91, 0 
 
Table 5 presents the results of panel regressions with two-way fixed effects.  In Column 1 of 
table 5 the LR-test (2447.722, P=0) indicates that the fixed effect is supported in preference to a 
random effects specification. The positive and significant spatial coefficient implies that the spatial 
model is to be preferred to a non-spatial model. All the control variables have expected sign and 
significance except land inequality or income inequality which demonstrates a positive (insignificant) 
effect contrary to what one would expect. In Column 2 of Table 5, we replaced the land inequality 
variable by the income inequality variable. Yet, we obtain a positive (insignificant) effect of income 
inequality on HR.  
The encouraging aspect of our results is that not only economic and socioeconomic aspects 
within a country, but also its geographic position can alter its ability to raise standards of HR 
performance relative to international norms and standards. However, the significance of a spatially-
lagged dependent variable would be misleading if it picked up the effects of omitted spatially 
explanatory variables. For instance, one would expect that conflicts spread in a spatial manner 
especially along borders. And if we did not take it into account, our regression result could 
incorrectly suggest the existence of a spillover mechanism in the dependent variable.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 6: Spatial Durbin Model, spatial and time period fixed effects (1981-2010) 
Determinants (1) 
Spatial and 
time period 
fixed effects 
W1= Dist 
(2) 
Spatial and time period 
fixed effects (Bias-
corrected) 
W1= Dist 
(3) 
Spatial and time 
period fixed 
effects 
W2=Popdist 
(4) 
Spatial and time period 
fixed effects (Bias-
corrected) 
W2=Popdist 
Domestic conflict -0.089*** 
(-13.182) 
-0.089*** 
(-13.404) 
-0.090***        
(-13.735) 
-0.091***        
(-13.447) 
Ln GDP   0.233*** 
(4.195) 
0.230*** 
(4.054) 
0.305***         
(5.567) 
0.305*** 
(5.441) 
Polity 0.044*** 
(15.901) 
0.044*** 
(15.571) 
0.045***        
(16.080) 
0.045*** 
(15.717) 
Ln land inequality -0.002  
(-1.252) 
-0.002  
(-1.278) 
-0.002         
(-1.210) 
-0.002 
(-1.225) 
W*Domestic conflict 0.007  
(0.569) 
0.010  
(0.757) 
0.027*         
(1.787) 
0.030* 
(1.942) 
W*Ln GDP   0.402*** 
(3.966) 
0.390*** 
(3.765) 
0.072         
(0.879) 
0.059 
(0.702) 
W*Polity -0.011*  
(-1.930) 
-0.012 **  
(-2.108) 
0.000         
(0.008) 
-0.001  
(-0.216) 
W*Ln land inequality 0.015*** 
(4.659) 
0.015*** 
(4.497) 
0.018***         
(4.962) 
0.018*** 
(4.787) 
W*dep. var. 0.158*** 
(5.444) 
0.187*** 
(6.545) 
      0.171***  
        (5.584) 
0.205*** 
(6.795) 
R-squared 0.821 0.821 0.819 0.819 
Corrected R-squared 0.190 0.190 0.186 0.186 
Nobs 2730 2730 2730 2730 
Log L -1945.525 -1945.525 -1956.772 -1956.772 
Wald test spatial lag 
LR test spatial lag 
45.086, 0 
44.745, 0 
42.995, 0 
44.749, 0 
29.327, 0 
29.443, 0 
28.324, 0 
29.555, 0 
Wald test spatial error 
LR test spatial error 
45.838, 0 
45.800, 0 
42.941, 0 
45.803, 0 
28.620, 0 
28.773, 0 
26.645, 0 
28.804, 0 
Direct effect, Domestic 
conflict 
-0.089***       
(-13.274) 
-0.089*** 
(-13.471) 
-0.090***        
(-13.931) 
-0.091***       
(-13.465) 
Indirect effect, Domestic 
conflict 
-0.006 
(-0.394) 
-0.007         
(-0.444)  
0.012         
(0.740) 
0.014 
 (0.800) 
Total effect. Domestic 
conflict 
-0.095***        
(-5.839) 
-0.097***         
(-5.303) 
-0.077***         
(-4.212) 
-0.076***         
(-3.858) 
Direct effect, Ln GDP 0.247***         
(4.483) 
0.245***          
(4.397) 
0.309***         
(5.564) 
0.309***          
(5.484) 
Indirect effect, Ln GDP 0.509***         
(4.665) 
0.511***          
(4.263) 
0.150*         
(1.653) 
0.150 
(1.468) 
Total effect’ Ln GDP 0.756***         
(6.604) 
0.757***    
(6.298) 
0.460***         
(4.608) 
0.460*** 
(4.208) 
Direct effect, Polity 0.044***        
(15.779) 
0.044***        
 (15.548) 
  0.045***        
(16.382) 
0.045         
(14.921) 
Indirect effect, Polity -0.004 
(-0.715) 
-0.005        
 (-0.830) 
0.009         
(1.081) 
0.009 
(1.014) 
Total effect, Polity 0.039***         
(5.531) 
0.038***          
(5.267) 
0.055***         
(6.223) 
0.054*** 
(5.786) 
Direct effect, Ln land 
inequality 
-0.002 
     (-1.037) 
-0.001        
 (-0.970) 
-0.002        
(-1.020) 
-0.002        
(-0.990) 
Indirect effect, Ln land 
inequality 
0.017***         
(4.708) 
0.018***          
(4.556) 
0.021***         
(4.998) 
0.021***          
(4.670) 
Total effect, Ln land 
inequality 
0.015***        
(4.046) 
0.016***   
            (3.921) 
0.019***         
(4.678) 
0.019*** 
(4.359) 
 
LeSage and Pace (2009) advocate models that include both endogenous interaction effects 
(spatially lagged dependent variable) and exogenous interaction effects (spatially lagged 
independent variable). Hence in Table 6 we present results from a Spatial Durbin specification. As 
before we used both distance-only and distance and population-based weighting scheme. Moreover, 
we also present bias-corrected results (see Lee and Yu, 2010a; 2010b).  
Column 1 of Table 6 rejects the hypothesis that a spatial Durbin model can be simplified to 
the spatial lag model (Wald test: 45.086, p = 0.00; LR test: 44.745, p=0.00) or to spatial error model 
(Wald test: 45.838, p = 0.00; LR test: 45.800). Similarly, the other columns of Table 6 also rejects the 
spatial lag model and spatial error model in favour of a spatial Durbin model. In all specifications of 
Table 6, we found the coefficient of the spatially lagged dependent variable to be positive and 
significant, which tends to reinforce our main finding of size and proximity effects for human rights 
performance.  
Since the spatial Durbin model specification was found to be more appropriate, we identify 
the coefficients of the explanatory variables in the non-spatial model (see Section 3.2) as biased. 
Although it is tempting to compare the coefficient estimates in the non-spatial model with their 
counterparts in the two-way spatial Durbin model, any such comparison would not be valid (see 
Elhorst, 2010; Corrado and Fingleton, 2012). While the parameter estimates in the non-spatial model 
can be seen as representing the marginal effect of a change in the income level on level of human 
rights, the coefficients in the spatial Durbin model do not. Hence in Table 6 we report the direct and 
indirect effect estimates of the explanatory variables (LeSage and Pace, 2009). In the bias corrected 
two-way fixed effect spatial Durbin model (column 2 of Table 6) where a distance only weighting was 
used, the direct effect of domestic conflict appears to be -0.089. This means that the coefficient of 
domestic conflict of -0.094 in the non-spatial model is underestimated by 5.6%. Since the direct 
effect of domestic conflict is -0.089 and its co-efficient estimate is -0.089, its feedback effect 
therefore amounts to a relatively small reduction of 0.22%. On the other hand, while the indirect 
effects (spillover effect) in the non-spatial model are set to zero by construction, the indirect effect 
of a change in the domestic conflict variable in the spatial Durbin model appears to be 8.38% of the 
direct effect. Though this indirect effect is not significant, we find a significant indirect effect in the 
cases of GDP per capita and land inequality. This can be interpreted as a change in income or land 
inequality in a particular country affecting not only human rights in that country itself, but also that 
of its neighbouring countries. The bias corrected two-way fixed effect spatial Durbin model, where 
distance and population based weighting was used (column 4 of table 5), gives us qualitatively 
similar results except that we find an insignificant indirect effect for GDP per capita.  
As a final robustness check, presented in Table 7 below, the land inequality variable was 
replaced by the income inequality variable. All specifications of Table 7 substantiate the existence of 
a spillover mechanism in the dependent variable. Hence the results shown in Table 7 tend to 
reinforce our two main findings: firstly, that ‘beacon’ countries can play an important role in 
disseminating good HR practice to neighbours; and second, a large neighbour can have more 
influence on a country’s level of human rights than a smaller neighbour. 
  
Table 7: Spatial Durbin Model, spatial & time period fixed effect (1980-2010), robustness check 
Determinants (1) 
Spatial and 
time period 
fixed effects 
W1= Dist 
(2) 
Spatial and time 
period fixed effects 
(Bias-corrected) 
W1= Dist 
(3) 
Spatial and time 
period fixed 
effects 
W2=Popdist 
(4) 
Spatial and time 
period fixed effects 
(Bias-corrected) 
W2=Popdist 
Domestic conflict -0.093 *** 
(-14.120) 
--0.093*** 
(-13.807) 
-0.095***        
(-14.458) 
-0.095***        
(-14.148) 
Ln GDP   0.257 *** 
(4.631) 
0.254*** 
(4.475) 
0.350***         
(6.432) 
0.349*** 
(6.270) 
Polity 0.0442 *** 
(15.805) 
0.044*** 
(15.489) 
0.045***        
(15.944) 
0.045*** 
(15.589) 
Ln income inequality 
  
0.004 
(0.921) 
0.002         
(0.437) 
0.002  
(0.388) 
W*Domestic conflict -0.010  
(-0.739) 
-0.007  
(-0.510) 
0.023         
(1.523) 
0.026* 
(1.714) 
W*Ln GDP   0.405 *** 
(3.978) 
0.392*** 
(3.768) 
0.064         
(0.774) 
0.052  
(0.622) 
W*Polity -0.016 ***  
(-2.829) 
-0.018***  
(-2.972) 
0.004         
(0.696) 
0.003  
(0.422) 
W* Ln income inequality 0.040 *** 
(3.741) 
0.040*** 
(3.605) 
0.058  ***         
(4.258) 
0.057*** 
(4.118) 
W*dep. var. 0.162 *** 
(5.595) 
0.191*** 
(6.700) 
0.178*** 
(5.801) 
0.215*** 
(7.167) 
R-squared 0.820 0.821 0.819 0.819 
Corrected R-squared 0.188 0.188 0.183 0.183 
Nobs 2730 2730 2730 2730 
Log L -1947.550 -1947.551 -1959.630 -1959.742 
Wald test spatial lag 
LR test spatial lag 
38.737, 0 
38.541, 0 
36.841, 0 
38.541, 0 
22.000, 0 
21.850, 0 
21.540, 0 
21.724, 0 
Wald test spatial error 
LR test spatial error 
40.754, 0 
40.629, 0 
38.162, 0 
40.629, 0 
22.237, 0 
22.033, 0 
20.880, 0 
21.804, 0 
Direct effect, Domestic 
conflict 
-0.093 ***       
(-14.305) 
-0.094*** 
(-14.117) 
-0.095***        
(-14.822) 
-0.094***       
(-13.973) 
Indirect effect, Domestic 
conflict 
-0.028** 
(-1.894) 
-0.030*         
(-1.855)  
0.006       
(0.391) 
0.006         
(0.355) 
Total effect. Domestic 
conflict 
-0.122 ***        
(-7.506) 
-0.124***         
(-7.323) 
-0.088***         
(-4.719) 
-0.088***         
(-4.437) 
Direct effect, Ln GDP 0.272 ***         
(5.193) 
0.271***         
(4.716) 
0.354***         
(6.721) 
0.353***         
(6.216) 
Indirect effect, Ln GDP 0.522 ***         
(4.567) 
0.528***         
(4.465) 
0.146         
(1.619) 
0.162          
(1.579) 
Total effect’ Ln GDP 0.795 ***         
(6.620) 
0.800***         
(6.445) 
0.500***         
(5.003) 
0.515*** 
(4.566) 
Direct effect, Polity 0.044 ***        
(15.464) 
0.044***        
(15.988) 
  0.045***        
(15.948) 
0.045***        
(16.187) 
Indirect effect, Polity -0.011*   
 (-1.672) 
-0.011        
 (-1.588) 
0.0153* 
(1.842078) 
0.016          
(1.824) 
Total effect, Polity 0.033 ***         
(4.598) 
0.033***         
(4.415) 
0.061***         
(6.842) 
0.061*** 
(6.589) 
Direct effect, Ln income 
inequality 
0.006  
(1.267) 
0.006        
 (1.209) 
0.003 
(0.669) 
0.003       
(0.713) 
Indirect effect, Ln income 
inequality 
0.048 ***         
(3.879) 
0.048***         
(3.679) 
0.070***         
(4.248) 
0.071***         
(4.030) 
Total effect, Ln income 
inequality 
0.055 ***        
(4.106) 
0.054***        
(4.005) 
0.073***         
(4.287) 
0.075*** 
(4.106) 
  
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this study we have turned our attention to the possibility that neighbourhood effects might exist 
in a given country's achievement of relative progress in human rights. Such an analysis is not without 
its technical difficulties, due to the wide variety of countries involved and the long-run nature of the 
relationships that we have described. 
We have updated a comprehensive index of HR performance originally developed and used 
by Landman and Larizza (2009), and drawn on a number of other studies, in order to build empirical 
models capable of estimating the spatial dimensions of HR performance. Using a relatively simple 
spatial weighting model we initially compared each country's HR performance with what would be 
predicted by regression on a weighted average of its neighbours' performance. Our results tend to 
confirm earlier findings (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 
1999; Landman 2055a, 2005b; Landman and Larizza, 2009; Camp Keith 2012) that HR performance 
appears to be linked to other socioeconomic variables. Although we also find that this relationship is 
limited in terms of income/GDP and is probably only robust in the longer term. While (lagged) GDP 
per capita may be suggestive that causation is primarily from income to human rights, we cannot 
rule out the possibility of bi-directional causality. 
We also find clear regional patterns in HR performance that appear to go beyond what can 
be explained by GDP patterns alone. These patterns are picked up by including dummy variables for 
the world's major regions, as well as by the more explicit use of spatial econometric estimation 
techniques. The inclusion of simple cultural variables only mildly reduces the significance of the 
spatial terms, indicating that (within a country) there may be an interaction effect between the pure 
economic and the somewhat arbitrary geographic mechanisms involved. Notwithstanding the recent 
history of political liberalisation and varying degrees of democratization across broad groups of 
countries, such as the former Soviet Bloc, Latin America, parts of Asia, and most recently North 
Africa, we believe that this is the first study to attempt to disentangle the economic from the 
geographic factors involved.  
By the addition of the spatial context to the study of relative international HR performance, 
we believe our results contribute in a novel way to the wide body of literature on international 
norms in de facto measures of human rights performance. Despite the economic costs of 
implementing formal law to promote convergence with international HR norms, convergence may 
nonetheless occur via a country's proximity to good neighbours, even in the world's poorer and 
more troubled regions. Taken together, our findings tend to suggest that `beacon' countries can play 
a role in disseminating good HR practice to neighbours, at least in terms of relative HR performance. 
Finally, the regional approaches to economic development frequently adopted by multilateral 
institutions and aid agencies may well, albeit indirectly, encourage improvements in HR performance 
in countries not specifically party to any formal bilateral or multilateral agreement. 
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